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ARE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OVERCONFIDENT  
WITH THE EFFECT OF BUDGET FORECAST ERRORS  
ON BUDGET DEVIATION? 
ABSTRACT 
This study aims to examine the effect of budget forecast errors on budget deviations moderated by 
local governments’ overconfidence. The research sample used regency/city governments in Indone-
sia during the 2017-2019 period. The analysis tool uses Eviews version 10 and SPSS version 22. The 
results showed that budget forecast errors had a positive and significant effect on budget deviation, 
but the local government’s overconfidence cannot cause an effect of budget forecast errors on the 
budget deviation. Additional test results of this study also showed that regency/city governments 
who were overconfident tend to fail in controlling their budget which could cause a surplus or defi-
cit compared to local governments that were not overconfident. The same conditions apply to bud -
get forecast errors. This means that regency/city governments that are overconfident tend to esti-
mate budgets that are too high for revenue and/or budget estimates that are too low for expenditure 
compared to local governments that are not overconfident. Consistent with the main test results, 
this study shows that budget forecast errors have a significant effect on budget deviation and tend to 
occur in the Central Indonesian region category. Furthermore, overconfident regency/city govern-
ments cannot moderate the effect of budget forecast errors on budget deviations. Finally, these find-
ings indicate that there is no difference between the budget forecast errors and the budget deviation 
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INTRODUCTION  
A budget is an organization's financial plan-
ning for the future that contains the goals 
and actions needed by the organization in 
achieving these goals and generally covers a 
period of one year. This budget is translated 
into more concrete financial programs and 
plans and used by the organization to 
achieve organizational goals. Ratmono and 
Sholihin (2017) explain that a budget as a 
public policy statement, fiscal target, and as 
a means of control has an important influ-
ence in financial accounting and reporting. 
This condition occurs because the budget is a 
fiscal target that describes the balance be-
tween expenditure, revenue, and desired fi-
nancing, public policy statements, a control 
base that has legal consequences, a basis for 
evaluating government performance, and the 
results of budget realization are outlined in 
government financial reports as a statement 
of the government’s responsibility to the 
public. However, the budget and budget rea-
lization carried out by the government has 
limitations in measuring performance. This 
condition can occur because one of the 
measures of government performance is 
through an assessment of the effectiveness of 
budget realization, not only through finan-
cial figures, but also through the outcomes, 
benefits, and impact of budget realization for 
the community.  
 
Hansen and Mowen (2009) describe that 
budget has four important benefits, namely 
(1) forcing executives to plan, (2) providing 
information that can be used to improve de-
cision making, (3) providing performance 
evaluation standards, and (4) improving 
communication and coordination. Budget 
planning consists of budget policy formula-
tion, namely the preparation of local govern-
ment budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Be-
lanja Daerah, APBD) direction and general 
policies as the basis for operational planning, 
and budget operational planning, such as the 
preparation of activity plans and resource 
allocation (Mahsun, 2013). Furthermore, 
Mahsun (2013) explains that at the budget 
execution stage there is a possibility of bud-
get changes in the budget period and these 
changes are made in connection with strate-
gic regional government policies, adjust-
ments as a result of not achieving the set re-
gional revenue targets, and urgent needs. 
These budget changes will then be discussed 
together with the regional House of Repre-
sentatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Dae-
rah, DPRD) and subsequently outlined in the 
direction and general policy of the APBD 
along with the changes in the strategy and 
priorities of the APBD. These two changes 
are stipulated by the regional head as a 
guideline for regional apparatus in preparing 
programs and budget changes. 
 
Herianti (2019) specifies that the main issue 
of the budget planning process and budget 
execution is a budget deviation which is de-
fined as a condition that indicates the failure 
of the government to control the budget 
which can cause a deficit or surplus. Several 
important issues of a budget deficit that have 
taken place in regency/city governments in 
Indonesia during the last two years, for ex-
ample, the budget deficit of Rp900 billion in 
the Bekasi city government in 2018. This 
budget deficit eventuated because of high 
government expenditure without taking re-
gional revenue into account. Besides, in 2019 
there was a budget deficit in the city govern-
ment of Bandung which almost reached 
Rp609 billion. Such budget deficit occurred 
as local revenues had not reached optimal 
levels and unspent funds at end of the fiscal 
year (Sisa Lebih Penggunaan Anggaran, SIL-
PA) was not as predicted. This condition has 
resulted in the city government of Bandung 
making direct expenditure efficient and en-
couraging increased regional revenue and 
retribution. The same condition also oc-
curred in the West Bandung regency govern-
ment which experienced a deficit of Rp73 
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billion. This budget deficit eventuated be-
cause the revenue from land and building 
taxes was not achieved due to the new ad-
justment policy on the taxable value of the 
property (Nilai Jual Objek Pajak, NJOP) set 
by the government which affected the psy-
chology of taxpayers. After all, taxpayers are 
not ready for the tax increases.  
 
Johansson and Siverbo (2014) explain that 
in several countries in the world when there 
is a budget deficit, sanctions will be imposed. 
The budget deficit phenomenon that hap-
pens in regency/city governments does not 
only show that the government has failed to 
plan, implement, and control the budget. 
However, the budget surplus phenomenon 
also shows the same condition. When there 
is a budget surplus it shows that (1) the go-
vernment is not obedient in implementing 
the previously planned budget. This condi-
tion is because the budget is determined po-
litically between the government and the 
House of Representatives (Dewan Perwaki-
lan Rakyat/Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Dae-
rah, DPR/DPRD), (2) the inability of the 
government to plan, implement and control 
the budget, and (3) the failure of the govern-
ment to improve public welfare which can 
become the spotlight of the mass media. This 
condition is due to the characteristics of pu-
blic service-oriented public sector organiza-
tions that allow budgets to be managed effi-
ciently, effectively, and economically, to 
achieve budget balance. The balance of the 
budget while still taking into account the ac-
curacy of budget realization and good budget 
absorption allows an increase in public wel-
fare.  
 
The phenomena of budget deficits and sur-
pluses that took place in several regency/city 
governments throughout Indonesia indicate 
that the government has experienced a bud-
get deviation. One of the important factors 
that play a role in influencing the occurrence 
of budget deviation is the budget forecast 
errors. Budget forecast errors indicate the 
government's tendency to increase estimated 
revenue and reduce expenditure estimates 
(Patty, 2019), or the condition of budget 
forecast that is too high or otherwise too low 
(Rodgers & Joyce, 1996). Budget forecast 
analysis has an important role in economic 
policy (Boukari & Veiga, 2018; Auerbach, 
1999). This condition can occur because the 
budget forecast is a budget plan based on the 
various potential sources belonged to an or-
ganization. Revenue estimates that are too 
high can lead to shortcuts in the provision of 
public goods that have the potential to re-
duce public welfare. This means that when 
the government forecast a budget that is too 
optimistic, it has the potential to reduce pub-
lic welfare in conditions of not achieving 
budget execution. This condition shows that 
the government has experienced an error in 
forecasting the budget. Jonung, Larch, 
Favero, and Martin (2006) revealed that 
budget forecast errors had contributed to an 
increase in structural deficits in European 
countries.  
 
The forecast revenue budget that is too high 
and/or the expenditure budget that is too 
low at the regional level can increase the 
amount of debt, thereby reducing public wel-
fare due to the interest burden borne by the 
government. Dubois (2016) explains that in 
the budget cycle theory, the budget is used as 
a means of government politics to the public. 
This condition occurs because the govern-
ment tries to increase public trust through 
budget accountability. Accountability of go-
vernment budgets to the public tends to not 
achieve budget balance but rather budget 
deficits or surpluses as a representation of 
budget deviations that have the potential to 
reduce public welfare. Budget deficits and 
surpluses indicate the existence of infor-
mation asymmetry between the government 
and the public. This means that the govern-
ment has excessive information compared to 
the public so that the government can take 
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advantage of this excessive information to 
fulfill its interests. The government has more 
access to information related to the re-
sources it has for the planning, implementa-
tion, and even budget control processes, 
while the public has limited access to poten-
tial resources. 
 
Ariffianto and Adhariani (2018) explain that 
budgeting behavior is based on personal in-
terests to avoid the risk of uncertainty or in-
ability to predict future budgets. These per-
sonal interests are not only owned by the 
government, but also by regional representa-
tives. The consequence is the potential for 
the estimated revenue budget that is too 
high and/or the expenditure budget that is 
too low at the regional level, thus affecting 
the occurrence of budget deviations. Patty 
(2019) describes that when the government 
incorrectly forecasts the budget, the budget 
deviation will be high. The optimism of the 
government in forecasting the revenue bud-
get that is too high and/or the forecasting of 
the expenditure budget that is too low trig-
gers budget variance. This condition results 
in the government being inaccurate in im-
plementing public policies, thereby reducing 
the level of public welfare. 
 
The appearance of budget forecast errors on 
budget deviation is reinforced by the exis-
tence of the government’s overconfidence. 
Mofsinger (2010) explains that overconfi-
dence is an excessive trust that makes indi-
viduals overestimate their knowledge and 
underestimate predictions made because 
individuals overestimate their abilities. The 
consequence is that the individual will bear a 
greater risk in the decision-making process. 
Overconfidence is a type of cognitive bias 
that leads to forecast errors because indivi-
duals feel they know, so they can analyze 
correctly, but in reality, it is not the case. The 
overconfidence literature on public sector 
organizations that focuses on financial data 
is still of limited use by various researchers. 
This condition is caused by the difficulty of 
measuring overconfidence. Previous litera-
ture tends to focus on public companies to 
assess the overconfidence of managers and 
investors in decision-making. Therefore, this 
study is important to detect errors in the 
budget forecast in influencing budget devia-
tions which are strengthened by the govern-
ment’s overconfidence. 
 
The issue of overconfidence is still popular 
among financial behavior research (Huang, 
Jiang, Liu, & Zhang, 2011; Koo & Yang, 2018; 
Yang & Kim, 2020). This condition is be-
cause overconfidence can influence the bias 
of individual decision making which has an 
impact on their level of prosperity. In public 
sector organizations, local governments have 
overconfidence because they feel they have 
excessive knowledge of access to resources 
they have in the planning, implementation, 
and even budget control processes that can 
influence decision making. This knowledge is 
used as the basis for the budget planning 
process through to budget execution. Local 
governments are said to experience overcon-
fidence when there is a residue between 
budget growth and growth in budget realiza-
tion. This means that the local government 
considers that budget planning based on its 
knowledge sources is capable of achieving 
budget realization, but this is not always the 
case. The estimated residual value between 
budget growth and budget realization growth 
that is more than zero indicates that local 
governments tend to be overconfident in 
budget planning. 
 
Local government’s overconfidence in bud-
get preparation can strengthen the occur-
rence of budget forecast errors against bud-
get deviations. This condition can occur be-
cause the overconfident government tends to 
perform an error in estimating the potential 
budget proposed. After all, it depends on its 
irrational beliefs. This means that the go-
vernment is optimistic in planning the bud-
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get that budget realization will be achieved. 
When this cognitive bias is manifested in lo-
cal governments, they show too much confi-
dence in the presence of a budget deficit or 
surplus. Yang and Kim (2020) explain that if 
managers who have overconfidence invest 
excessively based on a biased optimistic 
view, their company's internal funds are like-
ly to run out quickly. Individuals who have 
overconfidence tend to view that such risk is 
low compared to individuals who do not 
have overconfidence (Kartini & Nugraha, 
2015). 
 
Based on the description of the research 
background above, the formulation of the 
research problem is whether the budget fore-
cast errors affect budget deviation modera-
ted by the local government’s overconfi-
dence? Thus, this study aims to examine and 
analyze the effect of budget forecast errors 
on budget deviation moderated by the local 
government’s overconfidence.  
 
Budget Forecast Errors and Budget 
Deviation 
 
The principle of accountability has been 
widely applied in public sector organizations 
to achieve good governance. To minimize 
and narrow the opportunities for irregulari-
ties to occur and it is the obligation of the 
community to participate in conducting su-
pervision (Dwiharja & Kurrohman, 2013). 
One important aspect of accountability by 
public sector organizations is financial ac-
countability. Surjono and Firdaus (2017) ex-
plain that financial accountability is related 
to financial integrity, disclosure, and compli-
ance with laws and regulations. Financial 
integrity is related to the relationship or 
match between accounting numbers and  
descriptions also their sources. Disclosures 
are concerned with the design and presenta-
tion of financial reports as a collection of 
snapshots of economic events affecting pu-
blic sector organizations for a period and 
contain sufficient information. Compliance 
with laws and regulations relates to financial 
reports prepared and published by public 
sector organizations per statutory provisions. 
 
Organizations need a budget as a form of fu-
ture financial planning that comprises of 
goals and actions needed by the organization 
in achieving organizational goals. In general, 
the organization's budget covers a period of 
one year and is expressed in monetary units 
(Mahsun, 2013). The important issue of 
budget deficits and surpluses shows that the 
government is experiencing a budget devia-
tion. An important factor that motivates 
budget deviation is budget forecast error. 
Patty (2019) explains that budget forecast 
errors happen when the government makes 
high revenues and low expenditure esti-
mates. The same condition was also ex-
plained by Rodgers and Joyce (1996) that the 
budget forecast errors occur because the go-
vernment either overestimate or underesti-
mate the expenditure of the budget. Overes-
timated revenue budgets and/or underesti-
mated budgets at the regional level can in-
crease the amount of debt. The consequence 
is that the government will pay an interest 
expense that can reduce public welfare. This 
means that the budget that should be used to 
meet the public interest is reduced because 
the government needs to pay interest ex-
penses as a result of the government's failure 
in estimating the budget. 
 
Organizations need a budget as a form of fu-
ture financial planning that comprises of 
goals and actions needed by the organization 
in achieving organizational goals. In general, 
the organization's budget covers a period of 
one year and is expressed in monetary units 
(Mahsun, 2013). The important issue of 
budget deficits and surpluses shows that the 
government is experiencing a budget devia-
tion. An important factor that motivates 
budget deviation is budget forecast error. 
Patty (2019) explains that budget forecast 
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errors happen when the government makes 
high revenues and low expenditure esti-
mates. The same condition was also ex-
plained by Rodgers and Joyce (1996) that the 
budget forecast errors occur because the go-
vernment either overestimate or underesti-
mate the expenditure of the budget. Overes-
timated revenue budgets and/or underesti-
mated budgets at the regional level can in-
crease the amount of debt. The consequence 
is that the government will pay an interest 
expense that can reduce public welfare. This 
means that the budget that should be used to 
meet the public interest is reduced because 
the government needs to pay interest ex-
penses as a result of the government's failure 
in estimating the budget. Patty's (2019) find-
ings show that budget forecast errors in-
crease the occurrence of budget deviations. 
Based on this description, the researcher 
proposes the following hypothesis. 
H1:  Budget forecast error has a positive 
effect on the budget deviation. 
 
Budget Forecast Errors, Overconfi-
dence, and Budget Deviation 
 
Previous literature examining overconfi-
dence in the context of public sector organi-
zations are limited. The importance of re-
search related to overconfidence is motivated 
by individual psychological factors in making 
decisions that involve irrational behavior. 
The consequence is decision-making bias 
that has an impact on reducing individual 
welfare. In public sector organizations, local 
governments have overconfidence because 
they feel that they have excessive knowledge 
of access to resources they have in planning, 
implementation, and even budget control 
processes that can influence decision mak-
ing. This knowledge is used as the basis for 
the budget planning process through to 
budget execution.  
 
Budget forecast errors, overconfidence, and 
budget deviation represent the presence of 
information asymmetry. Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976) explain that information asym-
metry occurs because agents have more ac-
cess to information than principals. In the 
context of public sector organizations, the 
agent is the local government and the princi-
pal is the community or the public. Local 
governments as agents have more access to 
information than the public, therefore local 
governments are aware of the various chan-
ges that have occurred in the budget and the 
instability of resources for budgeting (Patty, 
2019). Ariffianto and Adhariani (2018) ex-
plain that budgeting behavior is based on 
personal interests to avoid the risk of uncer-
tainty or inability to predict future budgets. 
These personal interests are not only owned 
by the government, but also by regional rep-
resentatives. As a result, there will be poten-
tial revenue budget estimates that are too 
high and/or budget that is too low at the re-
gional level, thus affecting the occurrence of 
budget deviations.  
 
Auerbach (1999) states that the revenue fore-
cast is an important input in designing fiscal 
policy, and the revenue forecast can reduce 
people's welfare. Repeated high estimates of 
revenue and/or underestimation of expendi-
ture at the regional level indicate irrational 
behavior of the government in budget plan-
ning. This irrational behavior arises because 
the government considers that they have 
more ability to access information, thus ig-
noring the accuracy of local revenue sources. 
Ultimately, the increase in public welfare is 
reduced. Based on this description, the re-
searcher proposes the following hypothesis. 
H2:  Overconfidence has a positive effect 
on the relation of budget forecast errors with 
budget deviation. 
 
Based on the description of the hypothesis 
above, the visualization of this research mo-
del is presented in Figure 1. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The author used local government regencies/
cities throughout Indonesia as research sam-
ples through the purposive sampling me-
thod. The data used in this study are budget 
reports and budget realization of all regency/
city governments in Indonesia which are ob-
tained through the website www.djpk.go.id. 
The number of samples in this study was 
1,524 namely 508 regency/city governments 
who uploaded budget reports and budget 
realization on the Directorate General of Fis-
cal Balance (Direktorat Jenderal Perim-
bangan Keuangan, DJPK) website during 
2017-2019. 
 
The variables of the budget forecast error, 
the overconfidence of regency/city govern-
ment, and the budget deviation were used by 
researchers in this study. To be clearer re-
garding the use of these three variables, the 
operational definition, and measurement of 
the variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
The ordinary least square (OLS) approach 
was used by researchers to test the research 
hypothesis. Therefore, researchers need to 
perform some classical assumption tests as a 
condition for using OLS. The aim is to mini-
mize residuals to reduce bias in conclusions. 
In other words, the classical assumption test 







Figure 1. Research Model 
Definition Measure Scale 
Budget Forecast Errors (BFE) 
The estimated revenue budget that is 
too high and/or the estimated budget 
expenditure is too low (Patty, 2019) 
 
Ratio 
Local Government Overconfidence 
(LGO) 
Excessive trust makes individuals 
overestimate their knowledge and 
underestimate predictions because 




If the regression result residual > 0 indicates that the regency/city 
government is overconfident in formulating the budget and is gi-
ven a value of 1, on the other hand, if the regression residual < 0 
indicates that the regency/city government are not overconfident 




Budget Deviation (BDV) 
A condition that indicates the failure 
of the local government to control the 
budget which can lead to underspend-






Table 1. Operational Definition and Variables Measure  
Source: Yang & Kim (2020), Herianti (2019), Patty (2019), Boukari & Veiga (2018); Wirasedana et al.(2018), Yang & Zhang 
(2017), Johanson & Siverbo (2014), Mofsinger (2010), Malmendier & Tate (2005).  
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aims to obtain BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator) research results. The classic as-
sumption tests used by the researchers were 
the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
tests, while the normality and multicollinea-
rity tests were not used by the researchers. 
This condition is based on the number of ob-
servations of the sample of this study that 
have met or exceeded the requirements for 
the use of regression as described in the cen-
tral limit theory, so the normality test is not 
mandatory for researchers (Gujarati & Por-
ter, 2009). Furthermore, the multicollineari-
ty test is not used by researchers because it is 
not directly related to the residuals, therefore 
the data is still BLUE (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009; Widarjono, 2016). The author use 
White's Heteroscedasticity-consistent vari-
ance and standard error to correct the pa-
rameter values obtained by the ordinary least 
square method and the output can be direct-
ly used by researchers as the final result of 
hypothesis testing because the heteroscedas-
ticity problem has been corrected (Ghozali & 
Ratmono, 2017). Data does not have autocor-
relation when the DW value range is 1.54-
2.46 (Winarno, 2015).  
 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive statistics aim to provide an over-
view or description of data seen from the 
mean and standard deviation. Table 2 pre-
sents the statistical descriptions of each vari-
able. The number of observations obtained is 
1,524 from the total sample of regency/city 
governments per year is 508 and calculated 
based on the three years of research, namely 
from 2017 to 2019. The mean value of the 
budget deviation variable is 0.987 which 
demonstrates that regency/city governments 
have failed in controlling their budget which 
can cause a surplus or deficit with a data va-
riability of 4.516. The mean budget error va-
lue of 0.150 indicates that regency/city go-
vernments have budget forecast errors that 
are too high for revenue and/or budget esti-
mates that are too low for expenditures with 
a data variability of 0.171. The local overcon-
fidence value of 0.415 indicates that regency/
city governments are overconfident in setting 
budgets and realizing the budget with a data 
variability of 0.492.  
The correlation values between the research 
variables are shown in Table 3. Correlation 
shows a close relationship between the re-
search variables. The higher the correlation 
value, the stronger the relationship between 
the research variables. The strong correla-
tion value is between budget forecast errors 
and budget deviation. The strong correlation 
between the two variables shows that the 
higher the budget forecast errors, the higher 
the budget deviation that occurs in regency/
city governments. Furthermore, the second 
strong correlation value occurs between the 
overconfidence variable and the budget fore-
cast errors. This condition shows that when 
local governments are overconfident in plan-
ning the budget, the budget forecast errors 
will be even higher. 
The hypothesis test results are shown in Ta-
ble 4. The first hypothesis, H1, explained that 
budget forecast errors had a positive effect 
on budget deviation. Meanwhile, H2 ex-
plained the effect of overconfidence on the 
relationship between budget forecast errors 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
Variables N Mean Std. Deviation 
BDV 1,524 0.987 4.516 
BFE 1,524 0.150 0.171 
LGO 1,524 0.415 0.492 
Table 3. Correlation of each Variable  
Variables BDV BFE LGO 
BDV 1.000     
BFE 0.373 1.000   
LGO 0.058 0.241 1.000 
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and budget deviations. The H1 test results in-
dicate that the effect of budget forecast errors 
on budget deviation has a coefficient value of 
9.865 and t-statistic of 3.278 at a significance 
level of < 1%. The results of this test indicate 
that the budget forecast errors have a positive 
and significant effect on budget deviation, 
thus H1 is supported. These results are in line 
with Jonung et al., (2006) and Patty (2019), 
the budget forecast errors increase the occur-
rence of budget deviations.  
 
The H2 test results show that the effect of 
overconfidence on the relationship between 
budget forecast errors and budget deviation 
has a coefficient value of 5.861 and t-statistic 
of 0.914 at a significance level of > 1% and 5% 
even 10%. The results of this test indicate that 
overconfidence cannot moderate the effect of 
budget forecast errors on budget deviation so 
that H2 is not supported. Local governments 
that have overconfidence when preparing 
budgets are unable to strengthen the occur-
rence of budget forecast errors against budget 
deviations. This condition is due to the ten-
dency of local governments to not use their 
irrational beliefs in formulating budgets due 
to the involvement of people's representatives 
in budget discussions. This means that the 
government is optimistic in planning the 
budget and therefore, the budget realization 
will be achieved based on objective financial 
data without involving dominant psychologi-
cal factors. Therefore, the budget formula-
tion that involves people's representatives 
allows the government to act rationally in 
formulating the budget, hence irrational be-
liefs that have an impact on overconfidence 
are reduced. 
 
The author conducted additional tests to 
complement the results of this study to ob-
tain comprehensive results in answering re-
search issues. The additional test consists of 
two parts, namely, test the difference in 
overconfidence in regency/city government 
regarding budget forecast errors and budget 
deviation shown in Appendix 1 and test the 
research hypothesis based on categories of 
geographic areas in Indonesia, namely west-
ern, central, and eastern Indonesia shown in 
Appendix 2. Table 5 shows that the highest 
mean budget deviation occurs when regen-
cy/city governments have overconfidence 
compared to when they are not overconfi-





Least Square Method 
Dependent Variable: BDV 
H2 
Least Square Method 
Dependent Variable: BDV 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
BFE 9,865 3,278*** 7,368 10,114*** 
LGO     -2,245 -1,214 
BFE*LGO     5,861 0,914 
Const. -0,494 -1,416 -0,087 -1,216 
R2 0.139 0.152 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.150 
F-Stat. 246.864*** 90.908*** 
Durbin-Watson Stat. 2.000 2.000 
N 1,524 1,524 
Note: BDV (Budget Deviation), BFE (Budget Forecast Errors), LGO (Local Government Overconfidence), BFE*LGO 
(Interaction between Budget Forecast Errors, and Local Government Overconfidence). Free of autocorrelation based 
Winarno (2015) with the rule of thumb 1,54 to 2,46. Heteroskedasticity with white-hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity con-
sistent standard errors and covariance. Sig. *, **, *** level 10%, 5%, 1%. 
Table 4. Hypothesis Results 
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regency/city governments are overconfident 
in setting and realizing the budget, the ten-
dency for budget deviation is higher than 
when local governments have overconfi-
dence. The same condition also applies to 
budget forecast errors. When regency/city 
governments have overconfidence in setting 
and realizing the budget, there is a tendency 
for budget forecast errors to become higher 
than when local governments are not over-
confident. 
Table 6 shows that the results of the multi-
variate test aim to find out the differences 
between categories of regency/city govern-
ments that are overconfident or not overcon-
fident related to budget forecast errors and 
budget deviations. The findings of this study 
indicate that there are differences between 
categories of regency/city governments that 
are overconfident or not overconfident rela-
ted to budget forecast errors and budget de-
viations. This condition is shown by the sig-
nificant Lawley-Hotelling trace value at the 
level < 1%. The author uses this value be-
cause there are two groups of dependent va-
riables, namely budget forecast errors and 
budget deviation. 
Table 7 shows the test of between-subject 
effects to test the different categories of re-
gency/city governments are overconfident or 
are not overconfident related to budget fore-
cast errors and budget deviation. The re-
search findings show that there are different 
categories of regency/city governments that 
are overconfident or not overconfident rela-
ted to budget forecast errors as indicated by 
the F-statistic value of 94.284 at the level < 
1% and budget deviation indicated by the F-
statistic value of 5.309 at the level < 1 %. If 
linked with Table 5, it can be seen that the 
highest mean value of budget deviation and 
budget estimate occurs when regency/city 
governments are overconfident compared to 
those that are not overconfident. This condi-
tion shows that when regency/city govern-
ments are overconfident in setting and rea-
lizing the budget, there is a tendency for 
more budget forecast errors and budget devi-
ation to become higher compared to local 
governments that are not overconfident. Ta-
ble 7 also shows the test of between-subject 
effects to examine differences in the catego-
ries of regency/city governments in western, 
eastern, and central Indonesia related to 
budget forecast errors and budget devia-
tions. The findings of the study show that 
there are no differences in the categories of 
regency/city governments in the three re-
gions related to budget forecast errors as in-
dicated by the F-statistic value of 0.504 and 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics  
Category Mean Std. Deviation    N 
Budget Deviation (BDV) 
Overconfidence 1.303 6.737 633 
No overconfidence 0.763 1.597 891 
Budget Forecast Error (BFE) 
Overconfidence 0.199 0.175 633 
No overconfidence 0.115 0.159 891 
Table 6. Additional Results of Multivariate  
Source Statistic F Statistic 
Wilks’ Lambda  0.941 48.086*** e 
Pillai’s Trace 0.059 48.086*** e 
Lawley-Hotelling Trace 0.063 48.086*** e 
Roy’s Largest Root 0.063 48.086*** e 
Table 7. Additional Results of Test Between Subjects 
Effect 
Source SS Df    MS F 
Based on Overconfidence/not overconfidence 
BDV 107.978 1 107.978 5,309**  
BFE 2.599 1 2.599 94,284***  
Based on Geographic Area Category  
BDV 17.479 2 8.740 0.428 
BFE 0.029 2 0.015 0.504 
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budget deviation indicated by the F-statistic 
value of 0.428.  
 
The purpose of the multivariate test on the 
geographic area category was to find out the 
differences between the categories of regen-
cy/city governments in western, eastern, and 
central Indonesia regarding budget forecast 
errors and budget deviations. The findings of 
this study indicate that there is no difference 
between the categories of regency/city go-
vernment in the three regions regarding 
budget forecast errors and budget deviations. 
This condition is indicated by the insignifi-
cant Lawley-Hotelling trace value at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels.  
 
The additional results of geographic area ca-
tegory test results for western, central, and 
eastern Indonesia regions shown in Appen-
dix 1 are consistent with the main test re-
sults. This condition can be seen through the 
results of the model I test for the three signif-
icant area categories at the level of < 1%. This 
means that the budget forecast error has a 
positive and significant effect on the budget 
deviation in the three regions. The Central 
Indonesia region has the most significant 
influence as indicated by the adjusted R2, 
which is 88.5% at the level of < 1% compared 
to the categories of eastern and western In-
donesia. Furthermore, these findings also 
indicate that overconfidence cannot mode-
rate the effect of budget forecast errors on 
the budget deviation. This condition indi-
cates that regency/city governments are 
overconfident in setting and realizing bud-
gets cannot affect the relationship between 
bud-get forecast errors and budget deviation.  
Appendix 2 shows that the highest mean va-
lue of budget deviation occurs in the regen-
cy/city government category in the eastern 
Indonesia region, compared to the western 
and central regions of Indonesia. The same 
conditions apply to budget forecast errors. 
This condition shows that regency/city go-
vernments in eastern Indonesia have failed 
to control the budget which can cause a sur-
plus or deficit which tends to be higher than 
regency/city governments in the western and 
central regions of Indonesia. Furthermore, 
regency/city governments in eastern Indone-
sia also have errors where budget estimates 
that are too high for revenue and/or budget 
estimates that are too low for expenditures 
tend to be higher than regency/city govern-
ments in western and central Indonesia. 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the multiple 
comparison test through the Tukey test to 
detect the difference between the three cate-
gories of western, central, and eastern Indo-
nesia related to budget forecast errors and 
budget deviations. These findings indicate 
that the three categories of western, central, 
and eastern Indonesia do not have signifi-
cant differences concerning budget forecast 
errors and budget deviations. This condition 
is known through the average value of differ-
ences in budget forecast errors and budget 
deviations thawt are not too far apart be-
tween the three categories of regions, so they 
do not have a significant impact. This means 
that regency/city governments in the west-
ern, central, and eastern regions of Indone-
sia have no differences in controlling budgets 
which can cause a surplus or deficit and an 
error in the budget forecast that is too high 
Mean Difference   Region 
BDV BFE 
Western Indonesia vs Central Indonesia 0,090 0,005 
Western Indonesia vs Eastern Indonesia 0,270 0,013 
Central Indonesia vs Eastern Indonesia 0,361 0,007 
Tabel 8. Additional Results of Geographic Area Category (Multiple Comparison) 
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for revenue and/or an underestimation of 




The findings of this study indicate that bud-
get forecast errors have a positive and signif-
icant effect on budget deviation, and over-
confidence cannot moderate the effect of 
budget forecast errors on the budget devia-
tion. The findings of this study also show 
that regency/city governments that are over-
confident tend to fail in controlling their 
budget which can cause a surplus or deficit 
compared to local governments that are not 
overconfident. The same conditions apply to 
budget forecast errors. This means that re-
gency/city governments that are overconfi-
dent tend to overestimate budgets for reve-
nue and/or underestimate budget for ex-
penditure compared to local governments 
that are not overconfident. Consistent with 
the main test results, this study shows that 
budget forecast errors had a significant effect 
on budget deviation and tend to occur in the 
Central Indonesian region category. Further-
more, the overconfidence of regency/city go-
vernments cannot moderate the effect of 
budget forecast errors on budget deviations. 
Finally, these findings indicate that there is 
no difference between the budget forecast 
errors and the budget deviation in the three 
categories of western, central, and eastern 
Indonesia.  
 
The contribution of this research to theory is 
that local government budgets are used as a 
political tool to increase public accountabi-
lity, therefore it is consistent with the budget 
cycle theory. Accountability of government 
budgets to the public aims to increase public 
confidence that the government has worked 
under applicable regulations. The budget is 
outlined in financial planning as an instru-
ment of local government to describe the fu-
ture of public policies that will benefit the 
public to gain political support. Also, budget 
planning to the budget execution stage tends 
to experience information asymmetry, there-
fore it is consistent with agency theory. This 
condition can occur because local govern-
ments have more access to the potential of 
human resources and use excess access to 
fulfill their interests, while the public is li-
mited in accessing information. This condi-
tion can be identified by the existence of defi-
cits and surpluses that occur in local govern-
ments. The result is that public welfare is re-
duced because the budget that should be 
used for the public interest is not properly 
absorbed. 
 
The contribution of this study in methodolo-
gy is the measurement of government over-
confidence using secondary data in the con-
text of public sector research allows re-
searchers to modify the overconfidence 
measurement in the public sector context. 
The author adapted the research of Mal-
mendier and Tate (2005), Yang and Zhang 
(2017), also Yang and Kim (2020) to mea-
sure overconfidence based on the regression 
results of asset growth on sales growth. The 
logic of this measurement is when the resi-
dual value of the regression results greater 
than zero indicates that the company manag-
er has overconfidence. This condition is be-
cause company managers have confidence 
that asset growth will be able to increase 
sales growth. However, if there is a residual 
or difference between the actual data and the 
regression results, it shows that the manager 
has overconfidence because the asset growth 
rate is not able to achieve the sales growth 
rate. Using the same logic, the researcher 
modified the overconfidence measurement in 
the context of the public sector by regressing 
the growth of the revenue budget against the 
growth in revenue realization. That is, when 
the residual value of the regression results is 
greater than zero, it indicates that the local 
government has been overconfident. This 
condition is because local governments have 
confidence that budget growth will be able to 
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increase growth in realization. However, if 
there is a residual or difference between the 
actual data and the regression result data, it 
shows that the local government has over-
confidence because the growth rate of the 
revenue budget is not able to achieve the 
growth rate of revenue realization.  
 
The policy contribution of this research is (1) 
the priority of regency/city government pro-
grams must be able to respond to changes 
that occur in the future and be able to ba-
lance public interests and be accountable for 
the lives of its citizen. As a result of this lack 
of attention, it has a negative impact on 
budget forecast errors which can affect the 
occurrence of budget deviations. This phe-
nomenon can be seen through the existence 
of budget deficit cases in several regency/city 
governments in Indonesia, and (2) regency/
city governments need to pay attention to 
underspending and overspending which 
shows the financial achievements of each sec-
tor or organizational unit in the local govern-
ment. The process of assessing the difference 
between underspending and overspending 
requires clear Expenditure Analysis Stan-
dards (Standar Analisis Biaya, SAB), Perfor-
mance Benchmarks and Cost Standards, and 
Minimum Service Standards (Standar Pela-
yanan Minimal, SPM) (Mahsun, 2013).  
 
The author realizes that every study has its 
limitations. Therefore, the limitations of this 
study are (1) measuring overconfidence 
which is still difficult in public sector finan-
cial accounting literature, hence researchers 
only use measurements that refer to research 
modified by researchers according to the con-
text of this study, and (2) the adjusted R2 
value of Main hypothesis testing ranging 
from 11% -15% indicates that the variables 
used by researchers are only able to explain 
the phenomenon by 11% -15%. Therefore, the 
description of these two limitations provides 
an opportunity for further research to further 
explore the measurement of overconfidence 
in public sector financial accounting, and use 
other variables that can affect budget devia-
tion in answering research issues such as 
budget turbulence, measurement, perfor-
mance based on value for money, local go-
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Category Mean Std.Dev N 
BDV 
Western Indonesia Region 0,981 5,719 885 
Central Indonesia Region 0,890 1,279 450 
Eastern Indonesia Region 1,251 2,723 189 
BFE 
Western Indonesia Region 0,147 0,161 885 
Central Indonesia Region 0,152 0,169 450 
Eastern Indonesia Region 0,160 0,215 189 
Appendix 2. Additional Results of Geographic Area Category (Descriptive Statistics)  
